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Steel: Constitutional Law - The Vagueness Doctrine: Two-Part Test, or Tw

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-The Vagueness Doctrine: Two-Part
Test, or Two Conflicting Tests? City of Chicago v. Morales,
119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
INTRODUCTION

For approximately two decades, criminal street gangs have plagued
American cities with violence, drug dealing, and intimidating conduct.
Cities have responded with a wide variety of law enforcement strategies,'
many of which operate on the fringes of the Constitution. In City of Chicago v. Morales,2 the United States Supreme Court utilized the often confused vagueness doctrine to strike down a broadly sweeping loitering law
aimed directly at criminal street gangs.
In 1992, the Chicago City Council held hearings to explore the problems criminal street gangs present for the city's residents.3 Witnesses testified that gang members assemble in public places as part of a strategy to
claim territory, recruit new members, and intimidate rival gangs and ordinary citizens.4 In reaction to its findings, the Chicago City Council enacted
§ 8-4-015 of the Chicago Municipal Code (Ordinance).5 The Ordinance

1. Tracey L Meares and Dan M. Kahan, The Wages ofAntiquated ProceduralThinking: A Critique
of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 198-99 (1998). These strategies are often referred
to as "order maintenance policing" and include the enforcement of loitering laws, curfews, and civil
injunctions.
2. City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
3. Morales. 119 S. Ct. at 1854.
4. Id.
5. The city council incorporated its findings in the preamble to the Ordinance, as follows:
WHEREAS, The City of Chicago, like other cities across the nation, has been experiencing an increasing murder rate as well as an increase in violent and drug related
crimes; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that the continuing increase in criminal street gang activity in the City is largely responsible for this unacceptable situation; and
WHEREAS, In many neighborhoods throughout the City, the burgeoning presence
of street gang members in public places has intimidated many law abiding citizens;
and
WHEREAS, One of the methods by which criminal street gangs establish control
over identifiable areas is by loitering in those areas and intimidating others from
entering those areas; and
WHEREAS, Members of criminal street gangs avoid arrest by committing no offense punishable under existing laws when they know the police are present, while
maintaining control over identifiable areas by continued loitering; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that loitering in public places by
criminal street gang members creates a justifiable fear for the safety of persons and
property in the area because of the violence, drug-dealing and vandalism often associated with such activity; and
WHEREAS, The City also has an interest in discouraging all persons from loitering
in public places with criminal gang members; and

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2000

1

Land & Water
Law Review, Vol. 35 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 9Vol. XXXV
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

instructs police officers to order groups of loiterers to disperse or face arrest

if the officer reasonably believes one of the loiterers is a criminal street
gang member.6 Refusal to promptly obey the dispersal order creates a
criminal offense punishable by a fine of up to $500, imprisonment for not
more than six months, and a requirement to perform up to 120 hours of

community service.'
Two months after the Ordinance was adopted, the Chicago Police Department promulgated General Order 92-4 to provide guidelines to govem
enforcement of the Ordinance. 8 The order purported to establish limitations
on the enforcement discretion of police officers "to ensure that the anti-gang
loitering ordinance is not enforced in an arbitrary or discriminatory way." 9
The city of Chicago enforced the Ordinance for three years.' 0 During this
time, the police issued over 89,000 dispersal orders and arrested over
42,000 people for violating the Ordinance."

WHEREAS, Aggressive action is necessary to preserve the city's streets and other
public places so that the public may use such places without fear[.]
Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code 8-4-015 (1992).
6. Id. Section 8-4-015 provides in pertinent part:
(a)Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a
criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more
other persons, he shall order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area. Any person who does not promptly obey such an order is
in violation of this section.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of this section that no
person who was observed loitering was in fact a member of a criminal street
gang.
(c) As used in this section:
(1) "Loiter" means to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose.
(2) "Criminal street gang" means any ongoing organization, association in fact or
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of
its substantial activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts
enumerated in paragraph (3), and whose members individually or collectively
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.
(5) "Public place" means the public way and any other location open to the public,
whether publicly owned or privately owned.
(d) Any person who violates this section is subject to a fine of not less than $100
and not more than $500 for each offense, or imprisonment for not more than six
months or both. In addition to or instead of the above penalties, any person who
violates this section may be required to perform up to 120 hours of community
service pursuant to 1-4-120 of this Code.
7. Id.
at (d).
8. Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1855. During the hearings preceding the adoption of the Ordinance,
"representatives of the Chicago law and police departments informed the city counsel that any limitations on the discretion police have in enforcing the ordinance would be best developed through police
policy, rather than placing such limitations into the ordinance itself." Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d
53, 58 (II1.1997).
9. Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1855 (quoting Chicago Police Department, General Order 92-4, reprinted
in App. to Pet. for Cert. 65a.). General Order 92-4 confines enforcement of the Ordinance to designated
police officers working in designated areas and outlines criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein. Id.
at 1855.
10. Id.at1855,n.6.
II. Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1855.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol35/iss1/9

2

Steel: Constitutional Law - The Vagueness Doctrine: Two-Part Test, or Tw
2000

CASE NOTE

In the ensuing enforcement proceedings, two trial judges upheld the
constitutionality of the Ordinance, but eleven others held that it was
invalid.' 2 The Illinois Appellate Court, in Chicago v. Youkhana, consolidated the pending appeals and invalidated the Ordinance on four counts:
The Ordinance (1) impairs the freedom of assembly of non-gang members;
(2) is impermissibly vague; (3) improperly criminalizes status rather than
conduct; and (4) allows arrest without probable cause. 13 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding the Ordinance violates the Due Process
Clause because it is impermissibly vague and an arbitrary restriction on
personal liberties.' 4 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether the Illinois Supreme Court correctly held that the Ordinance
violates the Due Process Clause because it is impermissibly vague.' 5 In a
six to three decision, the Court affirmed, holding the Ordinance impermissibly vague because it fails the requirement that legislatures establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement16
Focusing on the Morales decision, this case note argues that the vagueness doctrine is not the two-part test it is claimed to be, but is rather two
separate tests that conflict with each other. This note explains these two
tests and outlines their development through vagueness doctrine precedent.
This note then addresses which of these tests best represents the purposes of
the vagueness doctrine. Finally, it concludes by addressing the potential
consequences of the Morales Court's advisory commentary.
BACKGROUND

The Vagueness Doctrine- Two Conflicting Tests
In mounting a void-for-vagueness facial challenge the challenging
party asserts that the language of the challenged law fails constitutional
standards.' 7 Courts apply the vagueness doctrine to determine whether a
As commonly
void-for-vagueness facial challenge will succeed.' 8

12. Peter W. Poulos, Comment, Chicago's Ban on Gang Loitering: Making Sense of Vagueness and
Overbreadth in Loitering Laws, 83 CAL. L. REv. 379,384, n. 26 (1995).
13. Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 NE.2d 34, 36 (111.1995).
1997). The Illinois Supreme Court did not address
14. Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 59 (i11.
whether the Ordinance creates a status offense, permits arrests without probable cause, or is overbroad.
Id.
15. Morales, 119 S.Ct. at 1854.
16. Id. at 1861-62.
17. For commentators' perspectives on void-for-vagueness facial challenges, see generally John C.
Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189 (1985);
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67 (1960); Mark A. Richard, Comment, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in Village of Hoffman
Estates v. The Flipside. Hoffman Estates, Inc.: Revision or Misapplication?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1273
(1983).
18. The doctrine's rationale stems from the Due Process Clause of the Filth and Fourteenth Amendments - neither the federal government or state governments shall deprive any person of "life, liberty, or
4; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I,
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V,cl.
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(mis)understood, the vagueness doctrine is a single test composed of two
independent elements-the minimal guidelines requirement and the fair
notice requirement. 9 Failure to meet either element renders a law void for
vagueness. 2° The minimal guidelines requirement mandates that "laws must
provide explicit standards for those who apply them," so that arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is prevented. 2' The fair notice requirement
mandates that laws "give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
22
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.,
Through Supreme Court precedent, the minimal guidelines requirement
and the fair notice requirement have developed into two separate tests. The
minimal guidelines requirement seems to have developed into the "overly
broad" test, while the fair notice requirement has developed into the "hardcore violator" test.23 The two tests impose conflicting thresholds upon the
challenging party.
The "Overly Broad" Test
The "overly broad" test follows the premise that ill-defined laws necessarily proscribe an overly broad amount of conduct.24 Its analysis employs
two steps. First, the challenger must prove, with the benefit of third-party
standing, that the law reaches a significant amount of innocent conduct.25
If the challenger meets this burden, she then must prove that the enforcing
officer has discretion to apply the law in an arbitrary or discriminatory
manner. In sum, the "overly broad" test requires the challenger to prove
that the law's language reaches a significant amount of innocent conduct
and allows for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The following
void-for-vagueness decisions illustrate how the "overly broad" test developed through the United States Supreme Court's reliance on the minimal
guidelines requirement.

cl.3.

19. Morales, 119 S.Ct. at 1859.
20. Id.
21, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
22. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
23. "Overly broad" and "hard-core violator" are names created by the author to describe the conflicting tests that the Court has utilized in void-for-vagueness facial challenges.
24. The "overly broad" test is very similar to the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. Like
overbreadth analysis, the "overly broad" test defines the scope of conduct proscribed by the challenged
law through an assertion of third-party rights. The distinction between the "overly broad" test and the
overbreadth doctrine is found in their respective rationales. The rationale behind the "overly broad" test
is to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of laws that proscribe a significant amount of
innocent conduct. The rationale behind the overbreadth doctrine is to eliminate laws that have a chilling
effect on the public's willingness to exercise First Amendment rights.
25. This step generally occurs in the name of the fair notice requirement. A court will create hypothetical applications to determine if the challenged law distinguishes between innocent and threatening
conduct. The "overly broad" test does not question whether the challenged law gives fair warning asapplied tothe challenger's conduct.
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Coates v. City of Cincinnati 26 and Smith v. Goguen 27 are decisions in
which the Court believed that the challenged law, given a literal reading,
28
In Coates, a fivewas capable of reaching First Amendment rights.

member majority struck down an ordinance that made it a criminal offense
for three or more people to assemble on a sidewalk and "conduct them29
selves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.", Although conceding
that "annoying" has a common meaning, the majority concluded that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague because it did not say who must be
annoyed to justify a conviction."' Demonstrating its reliance on the minimal
guidelines requirement, the majority concluded its analysis by stating:
The city is free to prevent people from blocking sidewalks, obstructing traffic, littering streets, committing assaults, or engaging
in countless other forms of antisocial conduct. It can do so through
the enactment and enforcement of ordinances directed with reasonable specificity toward the conduct to be prohibited. It cannot constitutionally do so through the enactment and enforcement of an ordinance whose violation may entirely depend upon whether or not a
policeman is annoyed.3
Four Justices argued that the challenged law was not unconstitutionally
vague on its face and that the record was too incomplete to determine
32
whether it was vague as applied to the challenging party. In response, the
majority stated, "[t]he details of the offense could no more serve to validate

26. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
27. Smith v. Gogucn, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
28. The Court has noted on several occasions that it will demand a greater standard of specificity
when First Amendment rights are at issue. Smith, 415 U.S. at 573. However, this note argues, in cases
where the Court relies on the minimal guidelines requirement, the "overly broad" test is applied identically regardless of whether a First Amendment right is at issue. A comparison of the Court's analysis in
Coates and Smith (First Amendment cases) versus its analysis in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156 (1972), Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), and Morales (non-First Amendment
cases) illustrates that the "overly broad" test applies to both First Amendment cases and non-First
Amendment cases. Furthermore, employing the "hard-core violator" test, Justices filed identically
reasoned dissents in both First Amendment cases and non-First Amendment cases. It is not the First
Amendment that divides the vagueness doctrine, it is the conflict between the two tests.
29. Coates, 402 U.S. 611.
30. Id. at613-14.
31. Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 617 (separate opinion by Justice Black); Id at 618-21 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun followed the "hard-core violator"
test, concluding:
Any man of average comprehension should know that some kinds of conduct, such
as assault or blocking passage on the street, will annoy others and are clearly covIt may be vague as
ered by the 'annoying conduct' standard of the ordinance ....
applied in some circumstances, but ruling on such a challenge obviously requires
knowledge of the conduct with which a defendant is charged. Id. at 618 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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this ordinance than could the details of an offense charged under an ordi33
nance suspending unconditionally the right of assembly and free speech.
In Smith, a five-member majority held a statute imposing a criminal
penalty on anyone who "publicly... treats contemptuously the flag of the
United States" void for vagueness.
Demonstrating its reliance on the
minimal guidelines requirement, the majority stated:
We recognized that in the noncommercial context behavior as a
general rule is not mapped out in advance on the basis of statutory
language. In such cases, perhaps the most meaningful aspect of the
vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine - the requirement that a legislature establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. It is in this regard
that the statutory language under scrutiny has its most notable defciencies.35
The "treats contemptuously" phrase, argued the majority, "allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections . . .
[w]here inherently vague statutory language permits such selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process.,, 36 Four Justices employed the
"hard-core violator" test,37 concluding that the majority incorrectly held the
3
statute void for vagueness.

In Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville,39 the Court relied on the minimal guidelines requirement to unanimously strike down an archaic vagrancy
statute. 40 The Court held the statute void for vagueness because it encouraged arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.4' Consistent with the first
step of the "overly broad" test, the Court determined that the statute prohibited a large amount of innocent conduct.42 It stated, "[t]he Jacksonville or-

33. Id. at 616.
34. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974). The majority held that the statute fails the fair
notice requirement because it does not specify what qualifies as "contemptuous treatment." Id. at 574.
To do so, the majority employed the first step of the "overly broad" test, noting that "contemptuous
treatment" encompasses a significant amount of innocent conduct. Id.
35. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 575.
37. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
38. Justice White concluded, "I cannot, therefore, agree that the Massachusetts statute is vague as to
Goguen; and if not vague as to his conduct, it is irrelevant that it may be vague in other contexts with
respect to other conduct." Id. at 585-86 (white, J., concurring in judgment). Chief Justice Burger,
Justice Blaekmun, and Justice Rehnquist agreed with White's conclusion. Id. at 590 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 591 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1971).
40. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162. The unanimity of the Court's decision deserves a footnote in that
Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate. Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion in Morales,
joined by Rehnquist, openly criticizes the Papachristoudecision. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1883 (1999)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
41. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162.
42. The challenged statute deemed persons "neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending
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dinance makes criminal activities which by modem standards are normally
innocent. '43 The Court then criticized the legislative intent behind the statute, stating, "[d]efiniteness is designedly avoided so as to allow the net to be
cast at large, to enable men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the
eyes of police and prosecution, although not chargeable with any particular
offense.""
In Kolender v. Lawson, the Court relied on the minimal guidelines requirement, holding a California "stop and identify" statute void for vagueness. 4' The statute required persons who loiter or wander the streets to provide "credible and reliable" identification at the request of a stopping officer. 46 The defendant's actual notice was indisputable because he was arunder the challenged statute on approximately fifteen
rested or detained
occasions. 47 Writing for a seven to two majority, 48 Justice O'Connor stated:
[The statute] as presently drafted and construed by the state courts,
contains no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy the requirement to provide 'credible and reliable'
identification. As such, the statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has
satisfied the statute.49

Thus, concluded O'Connor, "[a]n individual, whom the police may think is
suspicious but do not have probable cause to believe has committed a crime,
is entitled to continue to walk the public streets only at the whim of any
police officer who happens to stop the individual.. ....
The "Hard-CoreViolator" Test

The "hard-core violator" test asserts that a law is not required to give
fair notice in every application, as long as it clearly proscribes a "core" of
conduct."' Its analysis employs two steps. First, the challenging party is

their time frequenting ... places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served ... " as criminal vagrants.
Id. at 158, n. 1. This, the Court concluded, "would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and
city clubs." Id. at 164.
43. Id. at 163.
44. !d. at 166.
45. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353 (1983).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 354
48. Justices White and Rehnquist dissented. White spoke directly of the "hard-core violator" test
stating, "[if any fool would know that a particular category of conduct would be within the reach of the
statute, if there is an unmistakable core that a reasonable person would know is forbidden by the law, the
enactment is not unconstitutional on its face ..... Id. at 370-71 (White, J., dissenting). As an interesting
historical note, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, both of whom endorsed the "hard-core
violator" test in Coates and Smith, switched sides in Kolender and voted with the majority.
49. Id. at 358.
50. Id. (citing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 86 S. Ct. 211,213 (1965)).
51. Id. at 370-71 (White, J., dissenting).
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required to prove that the law does not give fair warning as applied to her
specific conduct.52 If the challenger passes the first step, the second step
shifts the "burden" to the state. The state must prove, with the benefit of
third-party standing, that there is at least one conceivable application where
the law would give fair warning.53 Combining the two steps, the threshold
for a successful void-for-vagueness facial challenge under the "hard-core
violator" test requires proving that the law fails to give fair warning in every
conceivable application.5 4 The following void-for-vagueness decisions illustrate how the "hard-core violator" test developed through the Court's
reliance on the fair notice requirement.
In Parker v. Levy, 55 a five-member majority relied on the fair notice
requirement to reverse the Third Circuit's holding that two articles of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice were void for vagueness. In that case,
Howard Levy was charged and convicted of "conduct unbecoming an officer or gentleman" and "disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces. 56 The majority held, "Levy had fair
notice from the language of each article that the particular conduct which he
engaged in was punishable."57 The majority acknowledged that "differentiations" existed within its vagueness doctrine precedent, yet mysteriously
concluded:
None of [the differentiations] suggests that one who has received
fair warning of the criminality of his own conduct from the statute
in question is nonetheless entitled to attack it because the language
would not give similar fair warning with respect to other conduct
which might be within its broad and liberal ambit.5"
In Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,5 9

the Court relied on the fair notice requirement to unanimously reverse the
Seventh Circuit's holding that an economic regulation was void for vagueness. Consistent with step one of the "hard-core violator" test, the Court
stated, "[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of

52. Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,495 (1982).
53. Morales, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 1871 (1999) (Scalia, ., dissenting). The state gains the benefit of
third-party standing because it is simply required to show that one conceivable (i.e., hypothetical) valid
application exists.
54. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
55. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).

56. Id. at 737-38.
57. Id. at 755.
58. Id. at 756.
59. Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982). The challenged

ordinance required a business to obtain a $150.00 license if it sold any items that are "designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs." Failure to obtain such license resulted in a fine of not less
ten dollars and not more than $500.00. Id. at 492.
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others." Consistent with step two, the Court concluded that the challenger
must prove that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. 6'
This conclusion cannot be reconciled with the Papachristou(pre-Hoffman
Estates) or Kolender (post-Hoffman Estates) decisions. Nonetheless,
Hoffman Estates is frequently cited by lower courts as defining the threshfacial challenges outside the context of the First
old for void-for-vagueness
62
Amendment.
In United States v. Salerno, decided in 1987, the Court expressed a
facial challenge threshold nearly identical to that put forth in Hoffnan Estates.63 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a six to three majority, stated:
facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid. The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is
insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an "overbreadth" doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment.6 4
Salerno is not a vagueness doctrine case as the terms of the Bail Reform Act
were not challenged as impermissibly vague. 65 Nonetheless, a minority of
the Court cites Salerno's "no set of circumstances" test as the rule governing all facial challenges to laws that have no substantial impact on rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment. 66
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Morales, the Supreme Court held Chicago's gang-loitering ordinance void for vagueness because it fails the minimal guidelines requirement.67 The plurality applied the "overly broad" test and concluded that the

60. Id. at 495.
61. Id. at 497.
62. The Supreme Court of California recently relied on Hoffman Estates to uphold an injunction
forbidding gang members from entering a designated neighborhood. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929
P.2d 596, 612 (1997). It held that the challenged terms of the injunction were not impermissibly vague
when read in the context of the gang members' behavior. Id. at 614. The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. Gonzalez v. Gallo, 521 U.S. 1121 (1997).

63. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
64. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (emphasis added).
65. The challenged statute was the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which permits a federal court to detain
an arrestee without bail, pending trial, on the ground of such arrestee's dangerousness to any other person and to the community. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 3141 - 3151 (Law. Co-op. 1993 & Supp. 1999).
66. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1870-71 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Id. at 1886 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas have consistently endorsed Salerno 's
"no set of circumstances" test. The Salerno test has created much controversy within and between courts
and among scholars. See infra notes 126-28.
67. Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1856. Six opinions were filed in the case. Justice Stevens authored a six-
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Ordinance fails the minimal guidelines and fair notice requirements. 6" The
concurring Justices reluctantly deferred to the state court's construction and

concluded that the Ordinance fails the minimal guidelines requirement.69
The dissenting Justices applied the "hard-core violator" test and concluded
that the Ordinance fails neither requirement.70
The Plurality
The plurality addressed the Ordinance's purpose, to curb intimidating
and illegal conduct by criminal street gangs, and concluded:

We have no doubt that a law directly prohibiting such intimidating
conduct would be constitutional, but this ordinance broadly covers a
significant amount of additional activity. Uncertainty about the
scope of that additional coverage provides the basis for respondents' claim that the ordinance is too vague. 71
The plurality refused to apply the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine,
concluding that the Ordinance does not have a "sufficiently substantial im-

pact on conduct protected by the First Amendment to render it unconstitutional. 72 However, the plurality asserted that "the freedom to loiter for
innocent purposes is part of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.,

73

Thus, concluded the plurality, a

void-for-vagueness facial challenge is justified.

The plurality concluded that the Ordinance fails the fair notice requirement because its definition of "loitering"-"to remain in any one place
with no apparent purpose"-does not distinguish between innocent and

part opinion. He announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I, II, and V. Justice Stevens delivered an opinion with respect to Parts III, IV, and VI, in
which Justices Souter and Ginsberg joined. Justices O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in judgment, in which Justice Breyer joined. Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in judgment. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion. Justice
Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined.
68. Id. at 1854-63 (plurality opinion).
69. Id. at 1863-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Id. at 1865 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Id. at 1865-67 (Breyer, J., concurring in pat
and concurring in judgment).
70. Id. at 1867-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 1879-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 1856-57 (plurality opinion).
72. Id at 1857 (plurality opinion). The plurality stated:
The Ordinance does not prohibit speech. Because the term "loiter" is defined as remaining in one place "with no apparent purpose," it is also clear that it does not
prohibit any form of conduct that is apparently intended to convey a message. By
its terms, the ordinance is inapplicable to assemblies that are designed to demonstrate a group's support of, or opposition to, a particular view. Its impact on the social contact between gang members and others does not impair the First Amendment
'right of association' that our cases have recognized.
Id. (plurality opinion).
73. Id. (plurality opinion),
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threatening conduct 4 This, the plurality asserted, distinguishes the Ordinance from state-validated laws that attach "loitering" to some overt act or
criminal intent (i.e., loitering with intent to distribute drugs).7" Also, the
plurality refuted the city's argument that a dispersal order itself gives fair
notice:
Because an officer may issue an order only after prohibited conduct
has already occurred, it cannot provide the kind of advance notice
that will protect the putative loiterer from being ordered to disperse.
Such an order cannot retroactively give adequate warning of the
boundary between permissible and impermissible applications of
the law.76
With respect to the minimal guidelines requirement,77 the plurality began its
analysis by stating:
The broad sweep of the ordinance also violates the requirement that
a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement... [r]ecognizing that the ordinance does reach a substantial
amount of innocent conduct, we turn, then, to its language to determine if it necessarily entrusts lawmaking to the moment-to-moment
judgment of the policeman on his beat.78
In analyzing the statute's language, the plurality confirmed the Illinois Supreme Court's non-limiting construction of the Ordinance. The Illinois Supreme Court construed the Ordinance's definition of loitering-"to remain
in any one place with no apparent purpose"--as providing "absolute discretion to police officers to determine what activities constitute loitering.""'
The plurality refuted the city's argument that the Ordinance limits enforcement discretion in four ways. 0 First, the plurality concluded that the
Ordinance's inapplicability to persons who are moving or have an apparent
74. Id. at 1859 (plurality opinion). The plurality stated:
Since the city cannot conceivably have meant to criminalize each instance a citizen
stands in public with a gang member, the vagueness that dooms this ordinance is not
the product of uncertainty about the normal meaning of 'loitering,' but rather about
what loitering is covered by the ordinance and what is not.
d. (plurality opinion).
75. Id. at 1859-60 (plurality opinion). Such laws have been upheld in state courts, while "state
courts have uniformly invalidated laws that do not join 'loitering' with a second specific elerment.
Id. (plurality opinion).
76. Id. at 1860 (plurality opinion),
77. The concurring Justices signed onto the plurality's minimal guidelines holding. However, unlike
the plurality, the concurrences questioned the state court's construction. Thus, although the minimal
guidelines requirement allowed the Court to reach a majority, it is a majority that hinges squarely on the
fact that the state court refused to give the Ordinance a limiting construction.
78. Id. at 1861.
79. Chicago v. Morales, 687 N-E,2d 53,63 (111.1997).
80. Morales, 119 S. Ct.at 1861-62.
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purpose is an insufficient limitation because it does not reduce "how much
discretion the police enjoy in deciding which stationary persons to disperse.'
Second, the plurality determined that the requirement that an arrest is permitted only after a dispersal order is issued is an insufficient limitation because it does not provide any guidance as to when a dispersal order
should be issued." Third, the plurality asserted that the requirement that an
officer reasonably believe one of the loiterers is a gang member is an insufficient limitation because the Ordinance requires no harmful purpose and
allows arrest of non-gang members as well as gang members.83 Finally, the
plurality concluded that the enforcement instructions set forth in General
Order 92-4 are an insufficient limitation on the "vast amount of discretion"
granted to the police. 4
The Concurrences
Justice O'Connor focused solely on the minimal guidelines requirement, avoiding the issue of notice entirely.85 She concluded that, as construed by the Illinois Supreme Court, the Ordinance "fails to provide police
with any standard by which they can judge whether an individual has an
apparent purpose. 8 6 Justice O'Connor argued, "because any person standing on the street has a general purpose-even if it is simply to stand-the
ordinance permits police officers to choose which purposes are permissible."87 Justice O'Connor prefaced each of her conclusive statements by
noting that she based her reasoning on the state court's construction of the
Ordinance. 8 She asserted that the Ordinance might be constitutional if it
only criminalized loitering by gang members, and argued that the state court
could have construed it more narrowly. 9
Justice Breyer asserted that the Ordinance, as applied to some defendants, might meet the fair notice requirement; "[a] statute . . . might not
provide fair warning to many, but an individual defendant might still have

81. Id.

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 1862.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1863-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice O'Connor

concluded that, because the Ordinance failed the minimal guidelines requirement, there was no need to

address the other issues reached by the plurality. Id. at 1864 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judment). Yet, through her refusal to join the plurality's notice requirement argument and
through her assertion that the Ordinance "could have been construed more narrowly," two clear inferences can be drawn. Justice O'Connor finds little, if any, significance in the notice requirement, and her
vote hinged squarely on the state court's non-limiting construction of the Ordinance.
86. Id. at 1862 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
87. Id. at 1863 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

88. Id. at 1863-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Illinois Supreme Court construed the Ordinance's definition of loitering as providing "absolute discretion to police
officers to determine what activities constitute loitering." Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 63 (111.
1997).
89. Morales, 119 S. Ct at 1864-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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90 Justice
been aware that it prohibited the conduct in which he engaged."
Breyer concluded, "I believe this ordinance is unconstitutional, not because
it provides insufficient notice, but because it does not provide sufficient
minimal standards to guide law enforcement officers." 9' He argued that the
Ordinance is invalid in all its applications because the officer enjoys unlimited discretion in all its applications. 92 According to Justice Breyer, "[tihe
ordinance is unconstitutional, not because a policeman applied this discretion wisely or poorly in one particular case, but rather because the policeman enjoys too much discretion in every case. 9 3 Like Justice O'Connor,
Justice Breyer emphasized that he based his reasoning on the Illinois Supreme Court's construction and that the Ordinance could have been construed more narrowly.94
"

The Dissents

Justice Scalia asserted that the plurality ignored Salerno's "no set of
circumstances" test and Hoffman Estates' "invalid in all its applications"95
challenges.
threshold as the rules governing void-for-vagueness facial
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, echoed this assertion:
[B]ecause this is a facial challenge, the plurality's ability to hypothesize that some individuals, in some circumstances, may be unable to ascertain how their actions appear to outsiders ["having no
apparent purpose"] is irrelevant to our analysis. Here, we are asked
whether the ordinance is vague in all of its applicato determine
96
tions.
Justice Scalia argued that the conduct of some of the respondents is clearly
proscribed by the Ordinance. 97 Thus, the Ordinance is not vague in all its
applications and is therefore immune from facial attack. 9 Both dissents
99
concluded that the Ordinance is not vague in its language, that it does not
grant police excessive enforcement discretion, '0 and that loitering is not a
protected liberty under the Due Process Clause.' 0 '

90. Id. at 1866 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. (Breyer, I., concurring in part and concurring injudgment).
Id. at 1866 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring injudgment).
Id. at 1867 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Id. at 1867-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1887 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1872 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).

99. Id. at 1879 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 1886-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1879 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 1885-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1873 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 1883 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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ANALYSIS

By applying the "overly broad" test, the plurality correctly held the Ordinance void for vagueness. The Ordinance clearly reaches a significant
amount of innocent conduct, encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and has a harsh disparate impact on the ethnic poor. As the dissents' conclusion illustrates, the "hard-core violator" test undermines the
utility of the vagueness doctrine. The concurrences correctly sided with the
plurality. However, they hid behind the state court's construction and failed
to endorse either of the conflicting tests, choosing instead to offer poorly
reasoned commentary.
"Overly Broad" Test Leads To Correct Conclusion
In America, individuals cannot be arrested without sufficient evidence
or probable cause for crimes that they might have comn-itted in the past, 1°2
and can never be arrested for crimes they might commit in the future. In
enacting the Ordinance, the Chicago City Council neglected these principles
and intentionally targeted innocent conduct. As its preamble states, the purpose of the Ordinance is to enable Chicago police to arrest gang members
who otherwise avoid arrest by "committing no offense punishable under
existing laws when they know the police are present."' 3 The Ordinance is
not intended to punish criminal conduct, but rather is intended to "enable
men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of police and
14
prosecution, although not chargeable with any particular offense."'
The Ordinance does not permit arrest unless a dispersal order is ignored. However, the dispersal order is triggered by two elements, neither of
which is criminal. 0 The first triggering element is that a group remains in
one place "with no apparent purpose."' 10 6 The second triggering element is
that an officer reasonably believes one person in the group is a gang member.10 7 As the Illinois Appellate Court noted, "[g]ang membership itself is
not a crime, and standing in a public place with no apparent purpose is not a
crime. Adding these actions together does not make them any more criminal. When you add nothing to nothing, you get nothing."' 0 8
By intentionally targeting innocent conduct, the Ordinance encourages
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Under the Ordinance, an officer
must make a personal determination as to whether a group has "no apparent
102. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1971).
103. See supra note 5.
104. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 166.

105. See supra note 6. The Supreme Court has held that a person cannot be punished for failing to
obeys police order that is itself unconstitutional. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1963).
106. See supra note 6.
107. d.
108. Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34,42 (111.
1995).
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purpose." Common sense dictates that every group has some apparent purpose (even if it is to stand still and do nothing).' °9 Thus, the Ordinance "requires the policeman to interpret the words 'no apparent purpose' as meanEach officer is free to
ing, 'no apparent purpose except for
Such unlimited
are
not."'
and
which
decide which purposes are permissible
clean" as they
the
streets
to
"sweep
departments
discretion permits police
2
see fit.''
_.,,"l

Liberal enforcement of laws aimed at people deemed undesirable by
society has consistently had a harsh impact on two groups of people-the
ethnic minority and the poor." 3 History indicates that such laws arise when
structural changes in a society leave certain groups unemployed with little,
at least legal, means of support." 4 As America has evolved from an indus-

try-driven economy to an economy based on high-tech information and
suburban services, countless jobs have left the inner-city, leaving its inhabitants a "ghetto underclass."" 5 This "ghetto underclass" both comprises
the street gangs and bears the brunt of their criminality. However, seeking
relief from such gangs through ill-defined laws is6 to ignore the problem in
favor of unconstitutionally attacking a symptom."

Chicago, like other American cities, has valid criminal laws that con-

t 7
stitutionally convict gang members for crimes." Legislatures and police
departments should focus on improving the enforcement of these valid laws,

109. Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct 1849, 1863 (1999) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurconcurring in part and concurring in judgment).
ring in judgment); Id. at 1866 (Breyer, J.,
110. Id. at 1863 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Id. at 1866 (Breyer,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
I11.Id. at 1863 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
112. Chicago's ordinance was used as a street-sweeping device. In 1994, the Chicago Police Department announced Operation EDGE, as part of its efforts to "enforce drug laws and the anti-gang loitering
ordinance." Cops Taking EDGE in Crime Battles, CHI. SuN-TIMES, July 5, 1994, at 14. Operation
EDGE involved flooding "hot spots" by as many as sixty uniformed officers, over a several-hour period,
and making dozens of arrests. Id. In one such sweep, out of one hundred arrests made, sixty-nine were
for gang loitering. Sweep Nets 100 Arrests, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 6, 1995, at Metro Briefings section.
113. Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1858, n. 20; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161-62
(1971). Sixty of the sixty-six defendants in Morales, whose cases were randomly consolidated, were
Black or Latino. Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance
Policing,89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 776, n. 2, (1999).
114. The English poor laws developed as the feudal system decayed leaving laboring classes, which
had been anchored to the soil, little means of support. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162, n. 4 (citing Ledwith v. Roberts, [19371 1 K.B. 232, 271). Likewise, during the reconstruction era, vagrancy statutes
were used to keep former slaves in a state of quasi-slavery. Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1858, n. 20 (citing T.
WILSON, BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 76 (1965)).

115. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 39-42 (1987).
116. JOHN HAGEDORN & PERRY MACON, PEOPLE AND FOLKS, GANGS, CRIME AND THE UNDERCLASS

IN A RUSTBELT CITY I11-128 (1988). Hagedom and Perry's study reveals that "increased gang involvement by adults is largely due to the drastically changed economic conditions in poor minority
urban neighborhoods." Id. at I 11.
117. See e.g.. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/12-6 (Intimidation); 570/405.2 (Streetgang criminal drug
conspiracy); 147/1 (Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act); 5/25-1 (Mob action), (West

1999).
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rather than constructing and relying on ill-defined laws geared at circumventing constitutional standards.
"Hard-CoreViolator" Test Undermines Vagueness Doctrine
The "hard-core violator" test undermines the vagueness doctrine. It
opposes the doctrine's goals, defeats the beneficial aspects of third-party
standing, and grants excessive significance to highly questionable precedent. With respect to the goal of the fair notice requirement, the "hard-core
violator" test does require legislatures to write laws that "give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited..
•.,,11Instead, the test permits legislatures to write excessively broad laws,
so long as they give fair notice in at least one application.' 1 9 With respect to
the goal of the minimal guidelines requirement, the "hard-core violator" test
does not seek to "prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement" by
mandating that "laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them."' 120 Instead, the test endorses laws that grant liberal enforcement discretion, so long as they are not always enforced in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. 121
With respect to the beneficial aspects of third-party standing, the
"hard-core violator" test does not allow the challenging party to attack an
invalid rule of law by proving that it criminalizes a significant amount of
innocent conduct. Instead, it "usurps that creative role" from the challenger
and grants it to the party in support of the vague law, "who can defeat the
[respondent's] facial challenge by conjuring up a single valid application of
the law.' 2 2 Thus, rather than permitting the legal action of one challenging
party to efficiently free others from an impermissibly vague law, the "hardcore violator" test mandates that every party proceed to court if some con-

118. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S, 104, 108 (1972).
119. Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1871 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's seemingly clever adaptation
of West Side Story employs "hard-core violator" analysis, arguing that the Ordinance is not subject to
facial attack. Justice Scalia asserts that, "Tony ... standing alongside and chatting with fellow gang
members while staking out their turf.., flashing gang signs and displaying their distinctive tatoos ... "
would have fair warning that his conduct violates the Ordinance. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). However,
what Justice Scalia neglects to recognize is that his character has an apparent purpose, rather than "no
apparent purpose," and thus he could mount a successful as-applied challenge to the Ordinance. Moreover, Scalia's example ignores the fact that Tony's conduct-gang intimidation-is punishable by statute
in Chicago. See supra note 117.
120. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
121. Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1885-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated:
I do not overlook the possibility that a police officer, acting in bad faith, might enforce the ordinance in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. But our decisions should
not turn on the proposition that such an event will be anything but rare. Instances of
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance, like any other law, are
best addressed when (and if) they arise .... Id.
122. Id. at 1871 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ceivable circumstance exists where the challenged law would give fair
warning.
The "hard-core violator" test relies solely on the fair notice requirement, despite the fact that the Court has often stated that the minimal guidelines requirement is the "most meaningful aspect of the [vagueness] doctrine.' 2 3 Rather than following the consistent holdings of Coates, Smith,
Papachristou,and Kolender, the "hard-core violator" test misinterprets the
significance of Parker, Hoffman Estates, and Salerno. The holdings of
Parkerand Hoffman Estates should be interpreted as applying only to military laws and economic regulations, respectively. The ParkerCourt used a
large portion of its opinion to emphasize the differences between civilian
and military society, concluding that a greater degree of vagueness is permitted within the Military Code than is permitted with respect to civilian
legislation. 24 And in Hoffman Estates, the Court stated:
The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates-as well as
the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement-depends in part on the nature of the enactment. Thus, economic
regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which
face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, 25can be expected
to consult relevant legislation in advance of action.1
dictum 12 6
Salerno's "no set of circumstances" test, which has been labeled
be reconciled with the Papachristou,
and deemed "draconian, '' 121 cannot
12
Kolender, and Morales decisions.
The Court should expressly endorse the "overly broad" test as defining
the analysis in void-for-vagueness facial challenges. Doing so would eliminate the confusion created by the "hard-core violator" test and its nearly
impossible threshold. As it stands, the vagueness doctrine's two elements
work against each other. The minimal guidelines requirement lightens the
123. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983);
Morales, 119 S.Ct. at 1863 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
124. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974).
125. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 598 (1982).

126. With respect to the Salerno test, the plurality stated, "To the extent we have consistently articulated a clear standard for facial challenges, it is not the Salerno formulation, which has never been the
decisive factor in any decision of this Court, including Salerno itself... We need not, however, resolve
the viability of Salemo's dictum.... Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1858, n. 22.

127. Mr. Michael C. Dorf has demonstrated the Court's refusal to apply the "no set of circumstances"
test in a number of cases following the Salerno decision. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State
and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994). Applying the same reasoning, Mr. John Christopher
Ford points out, "[tlhe no-set-of-circumstances test has appropriately been called 'draconian' in effect,
rendering it nearly impossible to succeed on a facial challenge." John Christopher Ford, Note, The Casey
StandardFor Evaluating FacialAttacks On Abortion Statutes, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1443, 1445 (1997).
128. All three of these cases fall outside the context of the First Amendment. Yet, in all three cases,
the Court did not require the challenger to prove the law invalid in every conceivable application.
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challenger's burden, while the fair notice requirement makes the challenger's burden greater.
The immediate solution is for courts to rely solely on the minimal
guidelines requirement. 29 By shifting the focus from a subjective inquiry
into the arrestee's notice to an objective inquiry into the scope of the enforcing officer's discretion, 30 the minimal guidelines requirement mandates
that an all or nothing answer is reached based solely on the text of the challenged law. If the answer is yes-the legislature provided explicit standards
to protect against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement-the law stands.
If the answer is no, the law cannot be constitutionally applied to anyone,
regardless of their conduct.'
Thus, a law that fails the minimal guidelines
requirement cannot be "saved," even by the harsh thresholds of Hoffman
Estates and Salerno.
Poorly Reasoned Commentary
Although the concurring Justices voted correctly, they softened the
majority holding in two ways. First, rather than condemning the Ordinance's intentionally vague language, they hid behind the state court's construction and incorrectly argued that the Ordinance could have been construed more narrowly. Second, rather than acknowledging that the Ordinance unconstitutionally targets the rights of gang members, the concurring
Justices suggested that the Ordinance does not single them out enough.
Throughout her concurrence, Justice O'Connor emphasized that she
was bound by the Illinois Supreme Court's construction of the Ordinance.
Yet, rather than exercising judicial restraint, she asserted:
In my view, the gang loitering ordinance could have been construed
more narrowly. The term 'loiter' might possibly be construed in a
more limited fashion to mean 'to remain in any one place with no
apparent purpose other than to establish control over identifiable ar-

129. Some scholars have suggested that the fair notice requirement should be eliminated entirely. For
instance, Mr. John C. Jeffries,
Jr., argues that actual notice carries little significance in our modem legal
system. Jeffries, supra note 17, at 205-12. Also, because courts have embraced the notion that simple
recordation of laws places people on sufficient notice, fair warning no longer stands as a persuasive

rationale for application of the vagueness doctrine. Id. at 205-07.

130. Defining the scope of an enforcing officer's discretion necessarily requires a court to examine
various circumstances in which the law could be literally applied, and to determine, in each of these
circumstances, if the enforcing officer retains too much discretion. Thus, this step takes on an over-

breadth-like analysis, granting the challenger third-party standing. However, this step remains objective
in that it does not question whether the enforcing officer applied his "discretion wisely or poorly in a
particular case," but whether the challenged law grants "the policeman [enjoys] too much discretion in

every case." Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1866 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
131.

Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1866 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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eas, to intimidate32 others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities.
Thus, in her view which was joined by Justice Breyer, courts have the
authority to insert clarity where none exists. This view would seem to violate separation of powers principles. Legislatures are required to enact laws
33
Courts
that "provide explicit standards for those who apply them."'
should not imply such standards, especially if they are intentionally left out
in the first place.
Justice O'Connor's construction transforms the Ordinance into a law

that combines loitering with some harmful purpose or effect.' 34 She either
is concluding that her construction is what the Chicago City Council intended, 35 or she is suggesting that courts should pursue an active role in
upholding intentionally vague laws. Apparently, the latter is true, as she
stated, "[t]his Court has never held that the intent of the drafters determines
whether a law is vague.' 3 6 While the Papachrislouopinion indicates that
her statement is inaccurate,137 the fact that her statement ignores a principal
canon of statutory construction signals a much larger problem. When the
language of a statute is unclear, courts have historically looked to legislative
intent. With respect to the Ordinance, one only must look as far as its preamble to see that the legislature intended to authorize 3arrests of gang mem1
bers in situations where no constitutional means exist.
Justice O'Connor concluded, "[i]f the ordinance applied only to persons reasonably believed to be gang members, this requirement might have
cured the ordinance's vagueness because it would have directed the manner
in which the order was issued by specifying to whom the order could be
issued."' 39 Her conclusion suggests that, although it is unconstitutional to
prohibit both gang members and their associates from loitering, it might be
constitutional to prohibit only gang members from loitering. An ordinance
prohibiting only gang members from loitering would have even greater constitutional problems than the Chicago ordinance because it would unconstitutionally criminalize a person's status. 140 The Illinois Appellate Court
132. Morales, 119 S.Ct. at 1864-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
133. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
134. See supra, note 131.
135. This would be a ridiculous conclusion because the Chicago City Council has enacted laws proscribing the same harmful purposes that Justice O'Connor inserts into the Ordinance. See supra note
117.
136. Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1865 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
137. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166 (1971).
138. See supra note 5.
139. Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1864 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
140. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). In Robinson, the Court struck down a California statute making it a misdemeanor for any person to be a drug addict. The Court held that the law
violated the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause because it made the status of
drug addict a criminal offense regardless of whether the defendant had ever used or possessed drugs in

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2000

19

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 35 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 9
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXV

made a persuasive argument that the Ordinance makes status a criminal
offense. 41 Such an argument would be difficult, if not impossible, to overcome if the law denied gang members the freedom to loiter, while preserving that freedom for others. As the PapachristouCourt stated, "[t]he rule of
law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the
poor as well as
42
the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together."'
CONCLUSION

The Morales decision demonstrates that the vagueness doctrine is best
characterized as a struggle between two conflicting tests. The "overly
broad" test is an effective tool for striking down laws that reach a significant
amount of innocent conduct and encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. Yet, as the dissenters' reasoning illustrates, the "hard-core
violator" test continues to play an undermining role in void-for-vagueness
facial challenges. The concurring Justices should have voted to endorse the
"overly broad" test; yet, they chose to hide behind the state court's construction and offer poorly reasoned commentary. Thus, until the Court's
membership changes, the most important lesson from Morales is that state
courts will play a crucial, if not determinative, role in deciding whether
void-for-vagueness facial challenges succeed. State courts should empower
the vagueness doctrine by endorsing the "overly broad" test and should
avoid inserting clarity where there is none.
MICHAEL C. STEEL

California. Id. at 667.
141. The Illinois Appellate Court reasoned:
Once the ordinance is triggered, it may apply equally to persons regardless of gang
membership, but the ordinance can only be triggered when a gang member is found
loitering. In other words, the Chicago ordinance prohibits gang members from loitering because they are gang members, not because they are loitering. Non-gang
members and those not associating with gang members are not prohibited from loitering. Therefore, it is not the conduct, but the status, that triggers this offense.
Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34,42 (1995).
142. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 171.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol35/iss1/9

20

